Intentionally fouling bad free-throw shooters is all the rage -- and all the outrage, too, it seems -- in the NBA Playoffs.
Basketball is very much a strategic game, but when does not work as well as it ought to, which is supported by the Game 4 loss by the Rockets. Part of that is because the Clippers are very good at rebounding DeAndre's missed free throws, but chalking up one statistical anomaly to prove or disprove anything doesn't do us much good.
Still, if a player is a sub-50 percent free throw shooter -- like Jordan is -- then the strategy does have some potential.
A larger part of the strategy, though, is the unintended impact, the self-harm that the strategy inflicts on a team itself. If the intent is to reduce an opponent's points per possession from their average, then it is imperative for the fouling team to maintain its own points per possession and not suffer a decline as well.
Was that the case for the Rockets?
Analyzing Game 4
Digging into the annals of NBA history is necessary to illustrate how the trend works and why coaches choose to implement it, but Game 4 provided plenty of reasons why the Rockets opted to do so.
Rockets' center bad enough for the strategy to make sense on paper.
This suggests that the threat of an unstoppable Jordan was worth halting the game and sending him to the stripe. Or, in terms of the numbers, fouling Jordan would lead to fewer points for the Clippers than having him play his game without Howard to defend him.
Jordan, again, made 14 free throws on 34 attempts. That's 0.82 points per possession on 17 possessions. With Jordan on the floor in the regular season, the Clippers scored 1.17 points per possession (that number is 1.11 in the playoffs). Simple arithmetic wins, but the strategy isn't just a plus and a minus, as previous research and common sense indicate.
We'll throw out Jordan's first two free throws in the first half and examine the Rockets' offensive results on the possession after fouling Jordan (13 possessions).
Possession | Player | Result | Points | After | Jordan Makes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Harden | 2 Made FT | 2 | Make | 2 |
2 | Harden | 3-Pt Make | 3 | Miss | 0 |
3 | Terry | 2-Pt Miss | 0 | Make | 1 |
4 | Capela | 2-Pt Miss | 0 | Make | 1 |
5 | Ariza | 3-Pt Miss | 0 | Make | 2 |
6 | Brewer | 2-Pt Miss | 0 | Make | 1 |
7 | Brewer | 2-Pt Make | 2 | Make | 1 |
8 | Brewer | 2-Pt Make | 2 | Miss | 0 |
9 | Brewer | 2-Pt Miss | 0 | Make | 1 |
10 | Brewer | 3-Pt Miss | 0 | Miss | 0 |
11 | Brewer | 2-Pt Miss | 0 | Miss | 1 |
12 | Harden | 3-Pt Miss | 0 | Miss | 0 |
13 | Terry | 3-Pt Miss | 0 | Miss | 0 |
 |  | Total | 9 | Total | 10 |
I have to foreground the obvious: it's a small sample size. I'm not indicating that this game was definitive proof that coaches should can the strategy. (The prior research has already more or less suggested that.)
Whether or not the Rockets' offensive output (0.69 points per possession) after fouling Jordan is indicative of the typical impact of a team that fouls intentionally, it does indicate how and why this strategy is not foolproof. Mitigating the opposing points per possession is only impactful if the fouling team can surpass the points-per-possession pace.
Clearly, the Clippers scored more on Jordan's free throws than the Rockets did after the attempts. In this case, the Clippers scored 0.77 points per free throw trip. Compare that to 1.12 in the regular season and 1.18 with Jordan on the court.
So the Rockets did what they intended: they turned the Clippers' offense into something resembling, well, DeAndre Jordan's free throw shooting. However, they could not capitalize.
Even though Jordan made just 10 of those 26 free throws, 7 of his 13 trips ended in makes, allowing the Clippers' defense to operate from, essentially, the same as if Jordan had just slammed in an alley-oop. The Rockets scored just 0.57 points per possession after a made free throw, a far cry from their 1.07 mark overall in the regular season and their 1.06 mark in the playoffs.
It isn't every day that a former superstar's outlook on an analytical strategy is positive, but Shaquille O'Neal, the very namesake of the strategy itself, makes valid and obvious points in regards to the approach. "I miss and we get a [defensive] stop, then the game is where it is," O'Neal said in an interview with Yahoo! Sports.
That's what happened. The game is where it was. If that makes sense.
But another rather glaring variable in the approach is personnel.
The fact that Howard was in foul trouble makes this a moot point, as the bench for the Rockets would have seen extended run regardless, but unless designated foulers swap out during free throws, the fouling team is stuck with a likely subpar offensive performer on the court, further limiting the offense's upside and narrowing the gap created by forcing the opponent to a smaller points per possession mark.
During the regular season, the Rockets posted an Offensive Rating of 101.6 with most reliant teams on analytics, will take a second look in the offseason.